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Introduction
Whether increasing resources matters for schooling outcomes, at all stages of the education sequence, remains controversial and at the heart of the education policy agenda of many countries.
Part of the reason is the considerable interest in the difficult question of how to turn around schools that are not performing well. Part is the concern as to whether additional resources can be used to improve the outcomes of 'hard to reach' pupils who currently leave the education system with few or no educational qualifications. This is a particular problem in countries, like the UK and US, where there are long and sizable tails in the bottom end of the adult distribution of basic literacy and numeracy skills (OECD, 1995) . The existence of large numbers of adults with poor basic skills in these countries (and the lack of them in other countries like Sweden or Germany) is frequently attributed to people being 'failed' or 'let down' by the education system. This is all the more relevant, and of general concern, because by now a large body of research fails to find evidence that giving more money to schools matters (see Hanushek, 2003) .
Only a small minority of papers -including the rather specific Maimonides rule paper on class sizes in Israel (Angrist and Lavy, 1999) and the 'experimental' Tennessee STAR class size reduction papers (Krueger, 1999; Krueger and Whitmore, 2001 ) -conclude that increasing resources matters for improving educational standards. And, even then, it is often argued that school inputs can only matter to a limited extent when compared to the impact of family background and the home environment.
Placed in this policy and research context, whether there is any scope for education policy to raise attainment in poorly performing schools becomes very important. This is true both for the individual pupils concerned and for the future of schools, especially if they become labelled as 'failing'. In English state schools in the 1990s, there were severe problems and a genuine need to raise standards, especially in inner city areas (LeGrand, 1993; Machin and Vignoles, 2005) 1 .
Whilst the current UK government has a stated commitment to raise standards in all schools, it has also devoted specific attention to the educational performance of children attending inner city schools, especially in deprived areas. This has been justified in various ways, including the notion that education acquisition matters a lot for adult outcomes, with some implication that it may well matter even more in the future.
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In this paper we ask the question of whether additional school resources matter. In doing so, we look in some detail at distributional impacts of resources in a way not addressed by much of the work on school resources, which tends to be more stark in its focus on giving a yes/no answer to the question. The approach we follow is to study a flagship policy of the UK government -the Excellence in Cities (EiC) programme -with an aim to shed some light on whether education policies that provide additional resources (directly targeted at the lower end of the income and education distribution) can improve educational standards. EiC is a well publicised policy aimed specifically at alleviating underachievement in inner city schools within England. In this programme, schools in disadvantaged, mainly urban, areas of England were given extra resources to try to improve standards. We use a study of the effects of the programme to question whether 3 such a resource based programme has scope to be useful in turning around the fortunes of badly performing schools in the inner cities.
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The perceived need to turn around the fortunes of schools in deprived inner city areas is certainly not unique to the UK. In the US, high profile policies include school vouchers and
Charter schools. However, unlike in the US and other countries where the school system is highly decentralised, the state school system is run on a national basis in the UK (albeit with differences between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). Hence there is scope for educational policies targeted at disadvantaged groups to be formulated and assessed in a much more systematic manner. This is because the policies themselves are designed with the national system in mind, trying at the same time to isolate areas where there are particular problems associated with poor educational outcomes. Of course, the target schools are in economically and socially deprived areas, and hence we need to pay close attention to selection issues in implementing our modelling approach.
The success or otherwise of the Excellence in Cities policy is of interest in an international context for a number of reasons. Firstly, as discussed above, it is an example of a policy designed specifically for schools in disadvantaged areas -and this is also a concern for policy in other countries. Secondly, it is essentially a resource-based policy. As already noted, there are many examples of resource-based policies that have failed to have an impact on outcomes, which has led some to argue that such policies should be rejected in favour of incentive-based policies (Hanushek, 2003) whereas others argue that this conclusion is attributable to the poor quality of many evaluation studies (Krueger, 2003) . Thirdly, the efficacy of area-based policies is of interest in other European countries. For example, a recent evaluation of such a policy in France could find 3 See Machin et al. (2004) for some early findings on EiC.
4 no evidence for positive impacts on educational outcomes (Bénabou et al. 2005) . Finally, it has been argued that the focus for policy should be in early childhood interventions since it is more difficult to improve an individual's abilities later in life (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003) . As noted by Lavy and Schlosser (2005) , the lack on evidence on the effectiveness of high-school interventions is particularly important given the debate over the relative merit of early versus late childhood intervention.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the salient features of the Excellence in Cities policy; in Section 3, we describe our data sources and then in Section 4 present a descriptive analysis of how outcome measures have evolved over time within schools exposed to EiC compared to other schools. In Section 5, we discuss the methodology -a difference-in-differences approach, which is combined with statistical matching. Then in Section 6, we present the results of the analysis -firstly, the overall impacts of the EiC policy on each outcome measure; and secondly a more detailed analysis for each EiC Phase where we examine how the effects of the policy vary over time; by the level of disadvantage in the school and for pupils of different abilities within these schools. In Section 7, we report the results of robustness tests where we examine whether the results reported in the differences-in-differences analysis could be attributed to the existence of pre-policy trends. In Section 8 we outline a simple CostBenefit Analysis, before concluding in Section 9.
Resources in English Schools and the Excellence in Cities Programme
Excellence in Cities was launched in 1999 in over 400 secondary schools in England and since then progressively increased in coverage. It is now implemented in about a third of all secondary 5 schools (over 1,000 schools). A complementary policy aimed at encouraging participation in higher education (College) was introduced to a subset of these areas in 2001. Furthermore, since
2001, a similar programme has been introduced for primary schools in another subset of these areas (on a pilot basis).
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the Excellence in Cities policy in secondary LEA maintained schools were affected. 6 Since there is considerable heterogeneity in the degree of disadvantage and school performance within LEAs, the policy does not cover every disadvantaged or poorly performing school in England and hence it is possible to find a comparison group of schools outside the policy.
Resource allocations to 'Partnerships' within EiC (i.e. LEAs and their schools) were largely based on pupil numbers and the level of disadvantage in the LEA (as measured by the percentage of pupils known to be eligible for free school meals). While there was some scope for discretion within Partnerships about how the funding was allocated to schools, Noden et al. (2001) 5 These Clusters are different from the main EiC Phases because the policy has not been targeted to all schools within a particular Local Education Authority but only to small clusters of primary and secondary schools within an area. There are only a small number of secondary schools in EiC Clusters. 6 Local Education Authorities are responsible for the strategic management of local authority education services including planning the supply of school places, ensuring every child has access to a suitable school place, intervening where a school is failing its pupils and for allocating funding to schools.
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show that criteria such as school size and the level of disadvantage of the school were important components of the decision. Hence there is heterogeneity in how much funding schools receive.
This varies from £50 per pupil in the more advantaged schools (in terms of pupils' eligible for free school meals) to about £140 per pupil in the least advantaged schools. The average for all EiC schools is about £120 per pupil per year (about 4.4 per cent of overall per pupil expenditure). At the outset, this funding was to be allocated to specific strands, but over time schools have been allowed greater flexibility over how the funding is used. In this paper, we evaluate the average impact of EiC on educational attainment and attendance at school over the time since its introduction in 1999. Thus, we assess the extent to which the whole range of activities carried out as a result of EiC funding led to an improvement in important educational outcomes. We focus on pupil-level attainment at age 14 (the end of key stage 3) 9 and a measure of school-level attendance (the percentage of half days missed). We consider variation in the effect of the policy according to when it was introduced to different areas; time since its introduction; the level of disadvantage in the school (and on pupils of different abilities within these schools).
Our methodology is based on a comparison between outcomes in schools where the EiC policy has been in place and schools in an appropriate comparison group before and after the policy was introduced.
Data Description
In England, compulsory education is organised around four 'Key Stages' from the age of 5 to 16. The first year of national pupil-level data that has been matched up with the pupil's prior attainment (at age 11) is in 1999 (i.e. the end of the school year 1998-99) -the pre-policy period for schools which have been longest in the EiC policy. These national data sets of pupil level attainment include the students' prior attainment, date of birth, gender and codes for the primary and secondary schools attended. 14 School-level variables were matched up with these school codes using the School Performance tables and information available in the LEA and School Information Service (LEASIS). 15 Further details of these data sets are contained in Table A1 of the Data Appendix. The set of explanatory variables used in this analysis are listed in the notes to Table 2 . We include only 'non-special' schools that are LEA maintained in the analysis. This excludes schools that exist exclusively for students with special needs, all independent schools and City Technology Colleges.
Our analysis is based on a comparison of pupils in EiC schools with pupils in non-EiC schools before and after the policy was introduced. We start out by comparing EiC schools to all 9 other LEA maintained schools in England. We then undertake a more in-depth analysis for schools within each Phase of EiC. The comparison group is then based on the results of propensity score matching in the pre-policy period (described below). First we present a simple descriptive analysis of the data.
Initial Descriptive Analysis
We consider the impact of the additional resources offered under the EiC programme on pupil achievement and on school attendance. The main outcome measures of interest are:
i) the probability that students attain the expected standard of "level 5" or above in Key Stage 3
Mathematics and English respectively;
ii) at school level, the percentage of half days missed.
In Tables 1a-1c, This reflects the relative disadvantage of EiC schools, which is why the policy was introduced in Although these results are encouraging about the potential effect of EiC policy in bringing about these changes, it is important to remember that EiC and non-EiC schools have very different characteristics that may not be fully accounted for when using a linear difference-in-differences estimator. The methodological approach implemented below attempts to control for these characteristics in a way that enables us to infer the causal effect of EiC policy on these outcome measures.
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Methodology
Basic Difference-in-Differences
Our modelling approach involves comparing pupil performance in 'treatment' schools (subject to the EiC policy) with schools in a comparison group, while attempting to take account of factors other than EiC that may explain any performance difference. The main modelling difficulty is in adequately dealing with such factors. A dynamic specification for pupil attainment, A, for pupil i in secondary school s in a particular time period t can be written as follows:
where EiC is a school level dummy variable indicating whether the school is assigned to the EiC group of schools, X denotes pupil characteristics, Z is a set of school characteristics and is an error term. The t term is a set of year dummies, included to capture year on year differences in pupil attainment. The model also contains a lagged dependent variable measuring pupil attainment in an earlier time period, t-1 for the individual pupil. The main coefficient of interest is q on the variable EiC s *D t=q where D t=q is one when the policy is effective in the school of child i.
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In our preferred specification we also generalise (1) by adding a full set of school fixed effects to control for unobservables at the school level. In this case all observable fixed school level characteristics (like the EiC s indicator) drop out as we model within-school effects of EiC:
Heterogeneous Impacts
One of the key questions is whether the effects differ by the level of deprivation of the school, the ability of the pupil and the length of exposure to the programme. We can provide some answers to this by interacting the term EiC s *D t=q in equation (2) The analysis for absences is the same as that outlined above except that it is implemented at school-level, as pupil-level information on absences is not collected nationally.
Statistical Matching
Some of the non-EiC schools can be quite different (on observable and unobservable dimensions) from the EiC schools. We thus include detailed controls for various school-level characteristics and prior attainment of pupils. This effectively balances the sample between the treatment (EiC) and the control schools. However, along the lines suggested in the matching literature we use the propensity score to eliminate schools from the treatment sample that do not compare well to any of the control schools (and vice versa). We then carry out the analysis on the subset of schools with sufficient common support in the treatment and control samples and allowing for school fixed effects to control for unobservables. 18 Excluded schools are those which are very different in the treatment and comparison groups on the basis of a whole range of prepolicy characteristics (as summarised in the propensity score). Further details of the approach are provided in the Data Appendix ( Figures A1-A3 ). We apply this approach when analysing the effect of EiC within each EiC Phase below. 18 Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997 demonstrate the importance of controlling for common support. Blundell et al, 2004, and , also combine matching with difference-in-differences We conduct this exercise separately for schools within EiC Phase 1, Phase 2 and Phase 3. In each case, school characteristics from the relevant pre-policy school year are used to estimate the propensity score.
Estimating the Impact of EiC
Overall Impact on Pupil Attainment
In and 5 repeat the most detailed specification (column 3) for boys and girls respectively.
In columns 1 and 2, coefficients are reported for each EiC group (i.e. Phase 1, Phase 2 etc.).
This should be interpreted at the time constant effect of belonging to that group of schools on the outcome measure. For example, in column 1, there is a coefficient of -.166 for Phase 1. The interpretation is that pupils who go to school in Phase 1 areas are less likely than other pupils to attain level 5 or above by 16.6 percentage points. This is also shown in the descriptive table (Table   1 ) and simply reflects the fact that schools in these areas are more disadvantaged. When pupil and school-level characteristics are included (in column 2), these coefficients become much smaller as measures of disadvantage (such as the percentage of pupils eligible to receive free school meals) are explicitly included in the model. These coefficients drop out of the regression when school fixed effects are included (i.e. columns 3-5).
The coefficient of primary interest is EiC*policyon, which is the effect of being educated in an EiC school over a time period in which the EiC policy was in effect. In the simplest specification (column 1), the coefficient is .034. 'difference-in-differences' estimate in the descriptive table above (Table 1) . Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on secondary schools). Specifications in (2)-(5) control for gender, prior attainment at age 11, a year dummy and a range of variables relevant to the pupil's secondary school and primary school: number of pupils; pupil-teacher ratio; percentage of pupils with special educational needs (with/without statement); percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals; percentage of non-white pupils; average performance of primary school (in terms of absences; attainment) at the time when it was attended by the pupil; average performance of secondary school in the pre-policy period (in terms of absences; attainment) dummies for the following: all boys school; all girls school; religious school; in rural area; sixth form (secondary); non-EiC Specialist School (secondary); grammar school (secondary); primary school type (infant; independent; special; other) ; missing value dummies; Interaction terms between fsm quartile of school, EiC status and prior attainment group of pupil (according to attainment in KS2 Mathematics).
It may be interpreted as follows: the effect of EiC was to increase the probability of attaining level 5 by 3.4 percentage points if one considers outcomes in the most recent year of the policy (2003) with the pre-policy year. Alternatively, one could say that EiC raised the percentage of pupils attaining level 5 or above by 3.4 percentage points.
However, this effect declines when one includes controls to reflect the fact that schools and pupils in EiC areas have different characteristics to those in non-EiC areas (although it does not make much difference whether or not one includes school fixed effects). Hence, controlling for characteristics the effect of the EiC policy is to increase the probability of attaining level 5 or above in Key Stage 3 Mathematics by 1.9 percentage points. 19 The effect is about the same for boys and girls.
In Table 2b , we allow separate effects for each Phase of EiC. In this case, larger effects are shown for schools that have been in the EiC Policy for longer. Thus, the most detailed specification (column 3), shows that EiC increased the probability of attaining level 5 or above by 2.6 percentage points in EiC Phase 1 schools; 1.6 percentage points in Phase 2 schools; 1.1 percentage points in Phase 3 schools; 1.2 percentage points in Cluster 1 schools; and not at all for the small group of schools that came into the EiC Policy in the last year (Cluster 2).
Thus, these regressions suggest that the EiC policy has had a causal impact on raising attainment in Mathematics in schools exposed to the policy. However, when these regressions are run for attainment in English, no effects are found. The positive 'difference-in-differences' estimated reported in the descriptive table (Table 1) reduces to zero, once we account for the fact that pupils and schools in EiC and non-EiC areas have different characteristics.
Overall Impact on School Attendance
In Tables 3a and 3b , analogous results are presented to those described above except that in this case, the data is at school-level and the dependent variable is the percentage of half days missed.
To estimate these regressions, all variables are averaged to school-level (see notes to Table 2 for a list of variables included in the controls).
As in the descriptive table (Table 1) , the first column suggests that EiC policy led to a reduction in the percentage of half days missed by about 1 percentage point. Once controls are added, the regressions suggest that the effect is to reduce absences by .59 of a percentage point. Thus, as with attainment in Mathematics, the EiC policy seems to have been effective in reducing absences or alternatively, increasing pupil attendance.
Heterogeneity in the Effect of EiC
The EiC programme does seem to have an effect on outcomes. In this sense increasing resources in a country such as the UK does seem to matter. We now wish to learn a bit more about who benefits most and how long it takes for such benefits to be felt.
Allocation of funding is partly based on the proportion of pupils in receipt of free school meals (as discussed in Section 2). First this means that the effect at the school level is likely to be lower for schools with less deprived pupils. However, it may well be that there are spill-over effects from the funding so that more funding outweighs the increased number of pupils on free school meals (FSM). As a result, comparing across levels of deprivation or across phases, while useful, does not tell us about whether extra resources matter more or less conditional on the overall level of deprivation.
On the other hand, the comparisons relating to the effect of the programme over time in the same schools is informative about the importance of length of exposure and/or learning about how best to use the extra resources. Finally, we also compare the effects of the programme by pupil ability, as measured by achievement prior to the programme. This comparison can be informative about which type of pupil is likely to benefit most by the increased resources. EiC schools (i.e. Phase 1, 2 and 3 respectively), we define a suitable set of control schools from non-EiC schools. 21 As explained in Section 5, this excludes schools in the EiC group that look very different from non-EiC schools (in terms of their observable characteristics) in the pre-policy year and vice versa. The difference-in-differences approach is then applied to the sub-sample of schools. We report results using the most detailed specification (i.e. equivalent to column 3 in Tables 2a and 2b) . 20 In Table A3 of the Data Appendix, we show the number of pupils/schools in these different categories in the most recent year of the EiC Policy (2003) Notes: only most detailed specification reported (i.e. as in column 3, Table 2 ). See notes to Table 2 for a list of control variables. Standard errors are clustered by school
In Table 4a , we show the effect of EiC policy in each year over the time since its introduction. There is a similarity between EiC Phases in that the policy had no impact in the first year after its introduction, but a significant, positive effect in the most recent year. For EiC Phase 1, the effect was close to 1 percentage point in the second and third year of the policy, and is 1.9
percentage points in the most recent year (more specifically, it led to an increase in the probability of attaining level 5 or above in Key Stage 3 Mathematics by 1.9 percentage points). In EiC Phase 2, there was no significant effect of the policy in the second year of the scheme, but is about 1 percentage point in the most recent year. Similarly, the effect of EiC for pupils in Phase 3 schools is 1.1 percentage point in the most recent year. It is not surprising to see that EiC took time to have an effect on pupil outcomes. From survey work undertaken at the beginning of the evaluation, it was noted that 'for many Partnerships, the first year and some of the second year was a tooling up period, with resources not flowing to all EiC partner schools and Strands in an immediate or uniform manner'.
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In Table 4c , we report results broken down by the level of disadvantage in the school (proportion of pupils with FSM). There is a similar pattern across all EiC Phases: the effect of the EiC policy is stronger in schools that are relatively more disadvantaged according to this measure. Almost all of these schools are within the group of most disadvantaged schools (i.e. the highest quartile of free school meals) and in fact, are the most disadvantaged schools of this group. Hence we should interpret the effect for EiC Phase 1 as the combined effect of EiC and PLC policy, 22 National Evaluation Consortium, (2001).
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which implies that the most deprived schools received increased funding more than proportionately to their increased numbers of pupils on FSM.
Finally, in Table 4d , we report the effects of EiC Policy for pupils of different abilities within each category of schools. For each EiC Phase, larger effects of the policy are found for pupils of high or medium ability than for those of lower ability -and are generally only found within more disadvantaged schools (i.e. schools in the highest or second-highest quartile of the distribution of free school meals). 23 For EiC Phase 1, the effect of EiC policy on high-ability pupils is to raise the probability of attaining level 5 by 4.8 percentage points in the most disadvantaged schools, and by 1.4 percentage points for those in the next category of disadvantage.
The only other significant effects are observable for pupils of medium and low ability in the most disadvantaged category of schools, where EiC is shown to raise their probability of attaining level 5 or above by 3.3 percentage points and 2.6 percentage points respectively. A similar pattern of results is observed for all phases of the programme, as can be seen in the Table. These results carry two important messages: It is quite clear given these results that an increase in resources can lead to improvement in the performance of pupils in some of the most disadvantaged schools in the country. Perhaps what may seem disappointing, from a policy perspective is that the benefit is almost entirely concentrated among the higher ability pupils. Thus the recurring theme that success builds on success (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003; Currie, 2001 ) is seen again here. This points to the need for early intervention to improve early achievement so as not to create an "underclass" of pupils in deprived areas that cannot be reached by policy interventions in the later years of their schooling.
A Pre-Policy Robustness Test
The main methodological concern is the possibility that outcomes were trending upwards in EiC areas (and differentially to that in non-EiC areas) prior to the introduction of the EiC policy. If this were the case, it would undermine the argument that improvements have been the result of EiC policy itself (i.e. since standards were already improving before the policy was introduced).
Unfortunately, we only have information on students' prior ability and primary school attended in EiC Phase 1 areas for one year prior to the EiC policy. However, we have information on the outcome measure back as far as 1997. This enables us to conduct the analysis (albeit using a much reduced set of control variables) pooling the years 1997 to 2003 and allowing the impact of EiC to vary by whether the policy was on or off. Similarly to Section 6, we estimate regressions for each EiC Phase separately for each matched sample of schools. We control for pupil gender, year and school fixed effects in addition to the EiC variables. Results are reported in Tables 5a and 5b . In the former, 'policy on' and 'policy off' years are aggregated for each EiC phase respectively. In the latter, the 'EiC effect' is reported in each year, where the 'policy-on' years are highlighted. In Table 5b , we also show the 'EiC effect' for Phase 2 and 3 when controlling for a full set of covariates for years in which this information is available (i.e. one 'policy-off' year for Phase 2;
two 'policy-off' years for Phase 3). Table 5a shows that the EiC effect is considerably larger in the 'policy-on' years than in the 'policy-off' years. One can easily reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the 'policy-off' years is equal to that of the 'policy-on' years and hence there is clear evidence of an improvement in educational standards in the EiC period. Nonetheless, there is still a small positive coefficient for the EiC effect in the 'policy-off' years. Further information on this is provided in Table 5b , where the EiC effect is estimated in each year. This shows that the EiC effect is significantly larger from the second year of the EiC policy onwards in the case of Phase 1 and 3 and from the first year of the policy in the case of Phase 2. Furthermore, any pre-policy trends become less marked (in the case of Phase 2) or non-existent (in the case of Phase 3) when additional controls are included.
24 Table 5 : A Pre-Policy Robustness Check Notes: year dummies; school fixed effects and a control for pupil gender are also included.
Hence, this analysis suggests that the positive effects described in the previous section can mainly be attributed to the effect of the EiC policy.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
We have seen that the impact of EiC was to raise attainment in Mathematics (though not in English) and to increase pupil attendance. To conduct an accurate Cost-Benefit Analysis, one would need to know how such effects translate into a range of later outcomes -for example, further education, probability of employment, wages, crime. There is also a possibility that the increase in pupil attendance has had a contemporaneous impact on crime in local areas (a possibility we do not explore here). Ideally, one would want to follow the children affected by these particular policies (and comparison groups) as they progress through school and into the labour market.
In the absence of this information, we need an alternative way to estimate the potential cost-effectiveness of EiC policy. We have good information on the costs -the average is £120 per pupil per year. One relevant question is how much the average benefits in terms of exam attainment (i.e. Table 4a ) would have to translate into higher wages for the policy to break-even.
The average rate of return to a year of schooling is fairly well accepted to be about 8 per cent for the UK. Using the Family Resources Survey for England and Wales, we can obtain a wage profile (an average of weekly earnings by age, for all individuals). If pupils were to obtain the equivalent benefit of a whole year of education at age 14 and then started work at age 16, the lifetime benefit of this extra year is estimated to be about £20,000.
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For a pupil in EiC Phase 2, exposed to three years of EiC policy (i.e. pupils taking examinations in 2003), the average benefit of EiC is to increase attainment in Mathematics by 0.01 of a level (Table 4a ). According to the National Curriculum a one level improvement corresponds to about 2 years of schooling. If this is true, the benefit of EiC is about 0.02 of a year of schooling (i.e. 0.01 x 2) -which comes to about £400 over the lifetime (i.e. 0.02 x £20,000). This is very similar to the cost of EiC policy (£120 x 3). Clearly, the benefit reduces if we average across subjects (since the policy had no effect on attainment in English). 
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and long term that we do not observe -for example, increased probability of staying on at school beyond compulsory school-leaving, higher probability of employment, lower probability of turning to crime. We hope to return to these issues in later research.
Conclusion
The issue about whether giving more resources to schools can enhance pupil performance remains controversial. In this paper we look at the issue by means of studying a major UK policy initiative -the Excellence in Cities programme -which gave more money to disadvantaged schools with the clear aim to alleviate underachievement and raise standards in inner city schools in England. Since its introduction in September 1999, it has expanded to cover one-third of all secondary schools and related policies have been introduced to primary schools and to encourage participation in higher education.
We find that, over time, the extra resources offered by the EiC policy were effective in terms of improving Mathematics achievement and in increasing school attendance. However, the effect of the policy is highly heterogeneous for different schools and different groups of pupils within schools. The beneficial effect of the policy is apparent within disadvantaged schools, but not within advantaged schools. This may be on account of the deliberate distribution of resources towards more disadvantaged schools. Within these schools, pupils of medium to high ability are significantly more likely to benefit than 'hard to reach' lower ability children in terms of attainment in Mathematics. Moreover, a fairly crude Cost-Benefit Analysis suggests that, while the EiC policy had no return in the earlier years (and costs therefore exceeded benefits), it is likely to (at least) break-even for more recent cohorts. In fact, benefits from such a policy do not need to be particularly large to generate a return when the average cost of the policy is only £120 per pupil per year (although there is much variation around that number). The question for the future is 29 whether such gains at Key Stage 3 and increases in pupil attendance at school manifest themselves in other outcomes such as further education, labour market performance and other social benefits such as crime reduction.
In conclusion, our findings show that additional resources can matter, and that education policies can help to turn around the fortunes of poorly performing inner city schools. But one needs to take a much more nuanced view than that adopted by much of the literature, where the focus is very much on offering a 'yes or no' answer to the question as to whether resources matter.
Our estimates show the picture is simply more complex than this. Resource-based policies can show positive results, even when the resources expended are relatively modest, but the benefits that accrue are highly heterogeneous. Indeed, in the context in which we study this question, the extra resources seem less effective in securing achievement gains for 'hard to reach' children, for whom different (and probably more intensive and earlier) policy treatments may be required. The linear index of the propensity score is computed a regression of whether the school is in an EiC Phase 1 area (or a non-EiC area) on pre-policy school-level characteristics. The propensity score is illustrated for EiC Phase 1 and non-EiC schools respectively in Figure A1 above. EiC (non-EiC) schools are retained within the matched sample if they are within the same range of the propensity score as the non-EiC (EiC) schools. This amounts to trimming tails of the distribution. 
Data Appendix
